Henry L. Stimson lectures, Yale University.

Note on Names and Places -- Abbreviations -- Introduction: Foreclosing Options -- PART I Harvest and Storm, 1989-92 -- 1. Two Dresden Nights -- 2. To Hell with That -- 3. Crossing the Line -- 4. Oblivion and Opportunity -- PART II Clearing, 1993-94 -- 5. Squaring the Triangle -- 6. Rise and Fall -- PART III Frost, 1995-99 -- 7. A Terrible Responsibility -- 8. Cost per Inch -- 9. Only the Beginning -- 10. Carving Out the Future -- Partnership Potential (map) -- Conclusion: The New Times

Thirty years after the Soviet Union's collapse, this book reveals how tensions between America, NATO, and Russia transformed geopolitics between the Cold War and COVID

Not one inch. With these words, Secretary of State James Baker proposed a hypothetical bargain to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev after the fall of the Berlin Wall: if you let your part of Germany go, we will move NATO not one inch eastward. Controversy erupted almost immediately over this 1990 exchange-but more important was the decade to come, when the words took on new meaning. Gorbachev let his Germany go, but Washington rethought the bargain, not least after the Soviet Union's own collapse in December 1991. Washington realized it could not just win big but win bigger. Not one inch of territory needed to be off limits to NATO. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Soviet collapse, this book uses new evidence and interviews to show how, in the decade that culminated in Vladimir Putin's rise to power, the United States and Russia undermined a potentially lasting partnership. Prize-winning historian M. E. Sarotte shows what went wrong