Hinge points : an inside look at North Korea's nuclear program
(2023)

Nonfiction

Book

Call Numbers:
355.0217/HECKER,S

Availability

Locations Call Number Status
Adult Nonfiction 355.0217/HECKER,S Available

Details

PUBLISHED
Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, [2023]
DESCRIPTION

xi, 386 pages : illustrations, map ; 24 cm

ISBN/ISSN
9781503634459, 1503634450 :, 1503634450, 9781503634459
LANGUAGE
English
NOTES

Nuclear background -- The state of play prior to January 2004 trip -- Would you like to see our product? : the improbable visit to North Korea -- Disastrous consequences of Bolton's hammer -- Back to North Korea : Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan, "No LWR, no deal" Bob Joseph, "No LWR till pigs fly" -- Kim Jong Il : buying time -- "Tell America it worked and North Korean people are filled with pride" -- 2009 : back to the negotiating table -- 2007 and 2008 visits : back to Yongbyon to confirm disablement -- 2008 : almost there, but it all falls apart -- 2009 and 2010 : clenching the fist instead of reaching for Obama's outstretched hand -- 2010 visit : "tomorrow, you will have a bigger surprise" -- November 2010 to April 2012 : Leap Day deal goes up in smoke along with DPRK rocket -- Does the U.S. blow the Leap Day deal up over one stupid rocket launch? -- From strategic patience to benign neglect -- The "fire and fury" of 2017 -- From the Olympics to Singapore -- The train wreck in Hanoi

"North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. Seen primarily through images of its eccentric leaders and goose-stepping soldiers, it makes the front pages when it test launches its missiles or conducts a nuclear test as it did with two spectacular successes in the latter part of 2017. It is difficult for the general reader to assess the real danger North Korea and its current enigmatic leader, Kim Jong Un, pose. Does he have a nuclear button that could launch nuclear-tipped missiles as he warned President Trump in his New Year's Day speech in 2018? How did North Korea, one of the poorest and most isolated countries in the world in the crosshairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years, progress from no nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of 30 to 50 weapons in 2021? Hinge Points posits that the conventional wisdom that America's good faith diplomatic efforts were circumvented by the North's repeated violations of diplomatic agreements is neither true nor helpful. The book takes a different look at the problem, one of critical introspection that combines rigorous analysis of political and technical developments. Hinge Points demonstrates that North Korea followed a dual-track strategy of diplomacy and nuclear development, variously emphasizing one or the other but never completely abandoning either. This strategy brought a steady stream of nuclear advances in Pyongyang. In Washington, these advances were interpreted as provocations or brinksmanship, and its responses were typically reactive and politically driven, focused on escalating sanctions and turning to China for help. This approach allowed North Korea to expand its program relatively unfettered. Mired in misguided assumptions and deep suspicions about North Korea, three U.S. administrations missed opportunities to mitigate risk and alter the trajectory of the North's nuclear program during times when Pyongyang favored diplomacy. Based on his own visits to North Korea and an in-depth analysis of the political and technical developments, the author argues that decisions should have been based on technically informed risk/benefit analysis that sought to manage the risks as best as possible, instead of trying to drive them to zero. Hinge Points reviews common-mode failures of the three administrations, including a needlessly heavy reliance on Beijing, ineffective utilization of sanctions as a policy tool, the lack of a holistic approach to peace on the Korean Peninsula, and the failure to properly prioritize and recognize the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat. An honest account of the history is not kind to Washington, but turning the lens inward to critically appraise Washington's role is the most constructive way for improving U.S. policy going forward. The book describes the political landscapes in the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations that led to "hinge points," and provides detailed assessments of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs at those times to demonstrate how Washington's response missed the mark, leading to the crisis we face today"--

Additional Credits