The generals American military command from World War II to today
(2013)

Nonfiction

Large Type

Call Numbers:
LARGE TYPE/355.0092/RICKS,T

Availability

Locations Call Number Status
Large Type LARGE TYPE/355.0092/RICKS,T Available

Details

PUBLISHED
Waterville, ME : Thorndike Press, 2013
EDITION
Large print edition
DESCRIPTION

861 pages (large print) : illustrations, maps ; 23 cm

ISBN/ISSN
9781410454706, 1410454703
LANGUAGE
English
NOTES

World War II -- General George C. Marshall : the leader -- Dwight Eisenhower : how the Marshall system worked -- George Patton : the specialist -- Mark Clark : the man in the middle -- "Terrible Terry" Allen : conflict between Marshall and his protégés -- Eisenhower manages Montgomery -- Douglas MacArthur : the general as presidential aspirant -- William Simpson : the Marshall system and the new model American general -- The Korean War -- William Dean and Douglas MacArthur : two generals self-destruct -- Army generals fail at Chosin -- O. P. Smith succeeds at Chosin -- Ridgway turns the war around -- MacArthur's last stand -- The organization man's army -- The Vietnam War -- Maxwell Taylor : architect of defeat -- William Westmoreland : the organization man in command -- William DePuy : World War II-style generalship in Vietnam -- The collapse of generalship in the 1960s -- At the top -- In the field -- In personnel policy -- Tet '68 : the end of Westmoreland and the turning point of the war -- My Lai : General Koster's cover-up and General Peers's investigation -- The end of a war, the end of an army -- Interwar -- DePuy's great rebuilding -- "How to teach judgment" -- Iraq and the hidden costs of rebuilding -- Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, and the empty triumph of the 1991 war -- The ground war : Schwarzkopf vs. Frederick Franks -- The post-Gulf War military -- Tommy R. Franks : two-time loser -- Ricardo Sanchez : over his head -- George Casey : trying but treading water -- David Petraeus : an outlier moves in, then leaves

History has been kind to the American generals of World War II and less kind to the generals of the wars that followed. Setting out to explain why, Thomas E. Ricks cites a widening gulf between performance and accountability. Then, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough. Today, as one American colonel said bitterly, "A private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."